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more moved to do what is right if he is given a paramount
right to custody. To permit the trial judge to ascertain
first that the child will be legitimated before awarding custody to the father and, in the absence of such action, to award
custody to another qualified person would more nearly achieve
that objective. Otherwise the trial judge must award custody
to the father without assurance that the child will be legitimated or, according to the alternative suggestion, may declare
the father unfit if legitimation is not accomplished, despite
the fact that the only hindrance may be the failure of his
wife to consent.
The trial court found that the best interests of the children
will be served by giving their custody to Frieda Howes. The
appeal being on the judgment roll, it must be presumed
that the evidence supports that determination. If upon a
future application it should be shown that the children's
interests would be better served because of a change in conditions of which legitimation of the children may be one, a
different order may be made. But upon the present record,
I would affirm the order of the trial court.
Gibson, C. J., concurred.

[L. A. No. 22321.

In Bank.

Jan. 22, 1954.J.

THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA TELEPHONE CORPORATION (a Corporation), Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Telegraphs and Telephones-Franchises-Privileges Granted
by State-Acceptance.-By 1905 amendment of Civ. Code,
§ 536 (now Pub. Uti!. Code, § 7901), the state offers to telephone corporations a franchise to construct lines along or
on any public-road or highway, and franchise is accepted when
such a corporation constructs its lines on public road or high:
way and maintains and operates a telephone system.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Telegraphs and Telephones, § 7; Am.Jur., Telegraphs and Telephones, § 28.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Telegraphs and Telephones, § 10;
[2, 7, 8] Telegraphs and Telephones, §] 1; [3, 4, 9-13] Telcgrnphs
and Telephones, § 12; [5] Appeal and Error, § 1346; [6] Injunctions, § 109(5).
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[2] Id.-Franchises-Local Franchises.-When a telephone corporation obtains a franchise under Civ. Code, § 536 (now Pub.
Util. Code, § 7901), it need not obtain a franchise from local
authorities.
[3] ld.-Franchises - Effect of Broughton Act.-The Broughton
Act (Stats. 1905, p. 777, formerly Deering's Gen. Laws, Act
2720, now Pub. Uti!. Code, §§ 6001-6017), unlike Civ. Code,
§ 536, does not grant any right of privilege, nor does it purport to empower or authorize boards of supervisors to grant
franchises or other privileges, but instead indicates an intent
to limit and restrict powers which may have been granted
under other laws by specifying procedure which must be imposed in granting of franchises by subordinate legislative
. bodies.
[4] ld.-Franchises - Effect of Broughton Act.-Where former
Civ. Code, § 536, did not give telephone company a franchise to
use public streets within city, and under city charter the company was required to obtain franchise from city for use of
such streets, the Broughton Act, requiring franchise holder to
pay municipality 2 per cent of gross annual receipts arising
from franchise, was applicable.
[5] Allpeal-Law of Case-Questions ·Concluded.-Where judgment for city in its action against telephone company for
injunction restraining company from using public streets without obtaining a new franchise from city (the former franchise
having expired) was affirmed on prior appeal, city is foreclosed
from challenging conditions attached to issuance of injunction,
and terms of judgment calling for payment for use of streets,
pending determination of appeal, according to company's actual
obligation as fixed by terms of expired franchise and not according to previous practice of company, are controlling
whether or not company misconceived its obligation under
ordinance during years former franchise was in effect.
[6] Injunctions-Appeal-Suspending Injunction-Trial Court.Trial court may protect the parties on appeal by providing
that its injunction or order is stayed, under conditions thnt
protect appellant by preserving subject matter of appeal pending outcome thereof and at same time protect respondent by
saving to it benefits of judgment in event of an affirmance.
[7a-7dl Telegraphs and Telephones - Franchises - Local Franchises.-Where city ordinance fixes compensation for telephone
company's franchise to maintain and operate poles and wires
on public streets at 2 per cent of company's gross receipts
"arising from the use of such franchise" (following language
of Broughton Act, § 3), the amount of gross receipts from
company's exchange service on which to apply such formula
is not limited to amount actually collected within franchise

)
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area but includes entire receipts from local calling area, since
receipts from exchange service represent a charge to subscriber
for use of all company's property within local area and amount
collected by company from any particular subscriber IS not
attributable solely to that subscriber's telephone but is attributable to all of equipment within calling area: and in allocating
receipts between franchise area and remainder of local calling
area an apportionment based on relative investment rather
than on mileage more appropriately measures gross receipts
attributable to various parts of local calling area, where conditions throughout area are not uniform.
[8a-8d] Id.-Franchises-Loca.l Franchises.-To determine amount
of intrastate toll revenue of telephone company attributable
to city under city ordinance fixing compensation for company's franchise to maintain and operate poles and wires on
public streets at 2 per cent of company's gross receipts arising
from the use of such franchise, the computatioll may begin
by taking company's total toll receipts in the state and then
determining city's share thereof by using ratio of total investment of company iL toll plant within the state to its investment in toll plant within city.
[9] Id.-Franchises-Effect of Broughton Act.-In applying the
Broughton Act it u. necessary to determine what proportion
of total annual gross receipts of public utility should be justly
accredited to its distribution system over various rights of
way, as distinguished from its power plants or other producing
agencies; this principle applies in case of a telephone company, as well as an electric company, since powerhouse of
electric companJ' llnd central plant of telephone company are
essential to operations of each, and neither would have any
gross receipts if it had only its central plant and no other
means Jf reaching its customers than by use of public streets.
(10) Id.-Franchises-Effect of Broughton Act.-The payment required under Broughton Act is based on gross receipts of
utility "arising fron its use, operation or possession" of franchise, and gross receipts of a utility, such as a telephone company, arise from all of its operative property and not exclusively from anyone part thereof; hence a franchise, in
common with othel operative property, contributes to total
gross receipts.
[11] Id.-Franchises-Effect of Broughton Act.-The words of
Broughton Act referring to receipts arising from use of franchise rather than to receipts arising from use of all of property
indicate that an apportionment is· to be made, and city may
110t properly compute amount due it for telephone company'.
use of franchise as if statute read that grantee shall pay proportion of 2 per cent of its entire gl'OSS receipts attributable

)
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to franchise area which number of miles covered by franchise
granted bears to total number of miles in franchise area.
[I2a-12d] Id.-Franchises-Effect of Broughton Act.-A reasonable method for apportionment of gross receipts between distributLDg system and other operative property of telephone
company 15 to allocate gross receIpts by ratio that company's
investment in :.ts distributing system in area bears to its total
inve::;tment in plant therein, it being reasonable to assume that
there is Ii relatiunship between value of property and amount
that it earns; an allocation made on a linear basis is not
feasible becausE' powerhouses. office buildings and the like cannot be measured by the mile.
[ISa, I3b] Id.-Franchise~-Effect of Broughton Act.-The tinal
step in determining amount of gross receipts arising from
telephone company's use of public streets within city is to
apportion gross receipts attributable to distributing system
. between parts thereof on public and private rights of way,
and an apportionment based on relative investment in such
parts of distributing system is appropriate where extent or
value of distrib".lting system over a given right of way may
indicate its earning capacity.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County. L. N. Turrentine, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Action to determine compensation due city for telephone
company's use of franchise to maintain and operate poles
and wires on public streets. Judgment determining amount
of compensation, reversed with directions.
J. F. DuPaul, City Attorney, Shelley J. Higgins, Assistant
City Attorney and T. B. Cosgrove for Plaintiff and Appellant.
John A. Sutro, Francis N. Marshall, Noble K. Gregory,
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, Oscar Lawler, Leslie C. Tupper·
and Lawler, Felix & Hall for Defendant and Appellant.
Walter C. Fox, Jr., and Chickering & Gregory, as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
TRAYNOR, J .-Plaintiff city of San Diego by Ordinance
No. 5681 granted defendant Southern California Telephone
Companyl a franchise to construct. maintain. and operate
'Since entry of judgment defendant company bas been merged into
its parent corporation. the Parifie Te:epllone and Telegraph Corporation.
The chanie of corporate identity is not material to the iasuea of thiI case.
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a system of telephone poles and wires upon the public streets
of the city for a period of 30 years from August 7, 1914.
When the franchise expired in 1944, the company assumed
that under section 536 of the Civil Code (now Pub. UtiI.
Code, § 7901) it had the right to use the streets without a
franchise, and therefore did not seek a new franchise. The
city Drought suit to enjoin the company from using its streets .
. On May 23, 1946, the superior court entered judgment declaring that .the company was committing a public nuisance
in using the public streets within so much of the city as was ineluded within its boundaries on March 19, 1905, the day before
section 536 was amended to apply to telephone corporations.
(We refer to this area, as do the parties, as the Old City.)
The judgment ordered the company within 30 days after the
judgment became final to abate the nuisance and enjoined it
from occupying the public streets within the Old City. The
judgment provided, however, that if within 30 days after
the judgment became final the company applied for a new
franchise IUld paid for the use of the public streets in the
Old City since August 7, 1944, the order to abate and the
injunction would not take effect, unless and until the company
failed to accept a new franchise or the city refused to grant
it. Both parties appealed, and the judgment was affirmed.
(Oity of San Diego v. Southern Oal. Tel. 00., 92 Cal.App.
2d 793 [208 P.2d 27].) Upon the going down of the remittitur, the company, on October 4, 1949, within the time
allowed, applied for a new franchise to use the public streets
within the Old City.
The present controversy is over the amount that the company must pay the city for use of the public streets of the
Old City between August 7, 1944, the date the franchise expired, and September 1, 1949, the first day of the calendar
month preceding its application for a new franchise. The
parties concede that their rights are governed by the terms
of the 1946 judgment. The relevant part thereof provides
that the company shall pay the city "that sum of money determined by applying the rate at which compensation for the
franchise and privilege of such use was fixed by Ordinance
No. 5681 of said city to the period from and including August
8, 1944 to, but not including, the first day of the calendar
month immediately preceding the filing of such application."
Ordinance 5681 fixed such compensation at "two per cent of
the gross annual receipts of such grantee and his or its successors or assigns arising from the use, operation or possession
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of said franchise." During the 30 years the franchise was in
effect, the company computed the amount due under the ordinance by a method that, according to the city, would result
in a payment of $421,435.68, if applied during the period in
question.
The trial court concluded that under the provision of th,e
1946 judgment quoted in the preceding paragraph, the
amount due was $239,337.23. Both parties appeal. The city
contends that the injunction was stayed on the condition
that in the interim the previous method of computation would
be continued and that the city is therefore entitled to $421,435.68. If that contention is not sustained, the city contends
that $333,541.14 is nevertheless due under the 1946 judgment.
The company contends that properly computed a payment of
only $158,670.03 is required. It has paid that amount to
the city.2 We have concluded that the applicable decisions
and principles of law sustain the company's method of computation and that the judgment appealed from must therefore
be reversed.
With minor exceptions the parties are in agreement as to
the facts. The controversy is over the application of the
1946 judgment to those facts. The following factual and
legal background is material in passing on the respective contentions of the parties.
The company operates a state-wide and interstate communication system. For tariff purposes its service is divided
into toll service and local or exchange service. Toll service
permits a subscriber to call an exchange outside his local
calling area, e. g., from San Diego to Los Angeles over the
lines of defendant company or from San Diego to New York
by use of a connecting system. A toll charge is made for each
toll call. Exchange service is generally charged for at a flat
or minimum monthly rate without a special charge for ea.ch
eall. Exchange areas are established by the Public Utilities
Commission and the boundaries thereof do not necessarily
follow political boundaries. Extended area service is an expanded exchange service whereby a subscriber may call
several exchanges without payment of a toll charge. The
San Diego extended area, which is over 40 miles long and
nearly 30 miles wide, includes most of the city of San Diego,
IAccordingly, the judgment appealed from is for ~SO,667.20 (the
c1ifference between $239,337.23 and $158,670.03) with interest from
October 4. 1949 (the date the new franchise was applied for) of
.1l,293.40, or a total of .91,960.60.
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all of the cities of Coronado, National City, La 1\1 (,S.1. El
Cajon, Chula Vista, and seyera] other communities, numerous
military establishments, and a large unincorporated area.
Most of the Old City is within the San Diego extended area;
a smalJ part is within the Del Mar exchange. which is not
within the extended area.
The company provides its service by a complicated system
of facilities. There are telephone instruments and drop wires
upon the subscribers· premises: a network of poles. \nres.
cables and conduits partly upon public streets and partly
upon private rights of way. referred to as "outside plant";
central offices with the equipment that makes and unmakes
connections between telephone Instruments; and offices and
equipment in which engineering. accounting. billing, and administrative activities are performed. Of these facilities, only
8. part of the outside plant occupies public streets; the remainder is on private property_
In 1905 the Legislature amended section 536 of the Civil
Code (now Pub. Util. Code. ~ 7901) to apply to telephone
corporations. 8 By that amendment the state offers to telephone corporations a franchise to construct lines along or
upon any public road or highway [1] The franchise is
accepted when such a corporation constructs its lines on the
public road or highway and maintains and operates a telephone system.· (County of Los Angeles v. Southern Cal. Tel.
Co., 32 Ca1.2d 378.382 (196 P.2d 7731.) [2] When a telephone corporation obtains a franchise under section 536, it
need not obtain a franchise from local authorities. (City
of San Diego v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co .. supra. 92 Ca1.App.2d
793, 808.) At the same 1905 session the Legislature enacted
the Broughton Act. (Stats. 1905. p. 777; formerly 1 Deering's Gen. Laws. Act 2720. now Pub Utii. Code. §§ 60016017.) This act operates in a different field from that covered
by section 536. [3] "The Broughton Act. unlike section
536. does not grant any right or privilege. nor does it purport
to empower or authorize boards of supervisors to grant franchises or other privileges. but instead indicates an intent to
limit and restrict the powers which rna:v have been granted
·Section 536 was amended to read: .• Telegraph or telephone corporations mny .!onstruct tines of telegraph or telephone lines along and upon
any pu hlic road or highway. aJong or across any of the waters or Jands
within this State. and may erect poJe8 posts. piers. or abutments for
Bupporting the insula.tors. wire". and other necesBary fixtures of their
lines, in such manner and at such points as not to incommode the public
ue of the road or hi&hway or interrupt the navigation of the waten."
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under other laws by specifying the procedure which must
be imposed ill the granting of any franchises by subordinate
legislative bodies." (County of Los Angeles v. Southern Cal.
Tel. Co., supra, 32 Ca1.2d at 383.) [4] In the previous
appeal in the prescnt case, it was determined that section
536 did not give the company a franchise to use the public
streets within the Old City and that under the city charter
the company was r('quired to obtain a franchise from the
city for the use of such streets. (City of San Diego v.
·Southern Cal. Tel. Co., supra, 92 Cal.App.2d at 803, 805.)
In 1914, when Ordinance No. 5681 was adopted, the Charter of the City of San Diego did not provide a procedure
for the granting of such a franchise to telephone companies.
The Broughton Act is therefore applicable. Section three of
that act provides that the payment by the holder of the franchise to the county or municipality granting the franchise
shall be "two per cent (2%) of the gross annual receipts of
the person, partnership or corporation to whom the franchise
is awarded, arising from its use, operation or possession."
(Now Pub. Util. Code, § 6006.) Ordinance 5681 of the city
of San Diego follows the language of section three of the
Broughton Act.
That section was interpreted by this court in County of
Tulare v. City of Dinuba (1922). 188 Cal. 664 [206 P. 983],
involving a dispute over the amount of payments to be made
by an electric company to a city and a county under Broughton
Act franchises. The company contended that section three
was void for indefiniteness. This court held the act valid,
after a careful analysis of its language and the problems
involved.
The court first pointed out that" The gross receipts of this
defendant accrue from two distinct agencies. One is the
generating plants or power-houses of the company, located
in three separate counties; the other is the distributing system,
consisting of poles and wires extending throughout the three
counties, partly upon and over streets and highways and
covered by various county and municipal franchises, and
partly over private easements owned by the company."
(188 Cal. at 673.) The Broughton Act, the court continued,
applies only to gross receipts "arising" from the "use,
operation or possession of the franchise." The payment required "is not a tax upon the property of the corporation.
nor a license charge for the priyilege of operating its business. It is a compensation for the use of the portions o-f the
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highway covered by the franchise easement, and it is limited
to such percentage of the total gross receipts as can be shown
to have arisen from the use of the franchise." (188 Cal. at
674.) The court prescribed a two-step apportionment for
determining that percentage. The first step is to determine
"what proportion of the total annual gross receipts of the
public utility should be justly accredited to its distributing
system over various rights of way, as distinguished from its
p,ower plants or other producing agencies." (188 Cal. at 681.)
This apportionment "will establish the fund from which the
percentage of earnings 'arising from the use, operation or
possession' of the various franchise easements shall be ascertained." (188 Cal. at 681.) The second step is to apportion
the receipts attributable to the distributing system between
the public and private parts thereof. The court rejected the
contention that this apportionment should be based on the
amount of revenues collected within each county or municipality (188 Cal. at 678-679), and concluded that ordinarily
an allocation on a mileage basis would be preferable, "not
necessarily as an exclusive method of distribution of the
gross receipts, but as a practicable one where the contribution
of the various franchise easements to the gross earnings cannot be otherwise determined." (188 Cal. at 681.)
The Tulare case was followed in Monrovia v. Southern
Counties Gas Co., 111 Cal.App. 659 [296 P. 117J, and Ocean
Park Pier Amusement Corp. v. Santa Monica, 40 Cal.App.2d
76 [104 P.2d 668, 879]. In the Monrovia case the utility had
paid to the various counties and municipalities for Broughton
Act franchises an amount estimated on the basis of the total
mileage in each county or municipality, eliminating that part
of the utility's earnings attributable to the use of its properties located on private property. The city of Monrovia,
however, did not accept this allocation and contended that it
should be paid 2 per cent of the gross recejpts from the sale
of gas within its boundaries. The trial court adopted· the
city's theory. The appellatoe court reversed, on the ground
that under the Tulare case an apportionment should be made
between receipts attributable to the use of the franchise and
receipts attributable to other property of the utility. Similarly,
in the Ocean Park case a wharf franchise followed the wording of the Broughton Act. Part of the wharf was on private
land and part on city property. The court reversed a judgment awarding the city 2 per cent of the total receipts from
the pier, holding that under the Tulare case the city could
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not collect for the occupancy of property not owned by the
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city.
' conten ds t h
. 0 f the
At the outset, t h
e CIty
at 'mterpretatIOn
1946 judgment does not turn on application of the Broughton
Act or Ordinance No. 5681 to the facts of this case. It
contends that the trial court stayed execution of the 1946
judgment on the condition that the status quo be maintained
pending outcome of the appeal and that the status quo to be
maintained was" the last actual peaceable, uncontested status
which preceded the pending controversy," namely, the status
that existed for 30 years preceding August 8, 1944. Under
any other interpretation, the argument continues, the stay
would have been beyond the power of the trial court. The
city then contends that maintenance of the status quo compelled continued application of the method of accounting
used by the company between 1914 and 1944 under the
expired franchise, and that the amount due by that method
is $421,435.68.
The trial court, however, did not issue an injunction and
thereafter stay its effect pending appeal. Instead, it provided that the injunction would not take effect until 30 days
after the judgment became final. Until that time, there was
nothing to be stayed. Even after the 30-day period, the
injunction took effect only if the company had failed within
that period to apply for a new franchise and pay for use of
the public streets during the interim period, or if it subsequently failed to accept a new franchise or the city refused
to grant it.
[5] Since the judgment was affirmed on the previous
appeal, the city is foreclosed from challenging the conditions
attached to issuance of the injunction. It bears noting, however, that a conditional injunction was appropriate to this
litigation. It is true that after the former franchise expired
the company no longer had permission from the city to use
the streets. (Cf. Village of Lapwai v. Alligier, 69 Idaho 397,
402 [207 P.2d 1025].) It is also true that the trial court
did not have the power to grant the company a new franchise;
it was the responsibility of the city, under its charter, to
determine whether the company should receive a new franchise. (Sunset Tel. ~ Tel. Co. v. Pasadena, 161 Cal. 265, 285
[118 P. 796]. ) Nevertheless, the question to be determined in
the previous trial and appeal was whether the company needed
a new franchise.The company conducted that litigation in good
faith and was partly successful. Aside from the rights of
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the company, it was clearly in the public interest that the
trial court withhold issuance of an injunction and thus
assure continued telephone service pending outcome of the
appeal. (See State v. Missouri Standard Tel. Co., 337 Mo.
642, 656 [85 S.W.2d 613].) Accordingly, the trial court in
the exercise of its discretion as a court of equity could delay
the taking effect of its injunction and allow the company to
use the streets until it was finally oetermined whether it
was required to obtain a franchise. The requirement that
the company continue to pay the amount due under its prior
obligation adequately protected the city in the interim.
Moreover, even if the action of the trial court were viewed
as a stay of an injunction that had previously issued, the
terms of the judgment do not support the city's contention.
The judgment provided that the company should pay "that
sum of money determined by applying the rate at which compensation for the franchise and prhilege of such use was
fixed by Ordinance No. 5681 of said City." It did not provide that payment should be computed according to the previous practice of the company; it called for payment according
to the company's actual obligation as fixed by the terms of
the expired franchise. The terms of the judgment are therefore controlling, whether or not the company misconceived
its obligation under the ordinance during the years the franchise was in effect. The judgment did not give either the city
or the company more or less rights in the interim than either
had had under the expired franchise.
[6] The city contends that the trial court did not have
power to stay its injunction unless it required the company
to continue to use the same method of accounting that had
been used in computing payments under the expired franchise. A trial court is not so limited. It may protect the
parties on appeal by providing that its injunction or order
is stayed, under conditions that protect the appellant by
preserTIng the subject matter of the appeal pending outcome
thereof and at the same time protect the respondent by saving to it the benefits of the judgment in the event of an
affirmance. (Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Superior Cou.rt, 197 Cal.
649, 669 [242 P. 725] ; see, also, City of Pasadena v. Superior
Court, 157 Cal. 781, 795 [l09 P. 620, 21 Ann.Cas. 1355].)
The terms of the expired franchise were an adequate standard
for determination of the amount that the company should
pay the city.
The determinative qu.estion on this appeal is thus the cor-
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rect interpretation of the ordinance. The ordinance fixed
the amount that the company should pay the city at 2 per
cent of the gross receipts "arising from the use" of the franchise, following the language of section three of the Broughton
Act. The controlling question is, what part of the company's
gross receipts should be taken as arising from the use of the
franchise, i.e., from the use of the public streets within the
Old City' To answer this question we must ( 1) determine
how the company's gross receipts are to be ascertained; (2)
apportion those receipts between the company's producing
plant, which is entirely on private property, and its distributing system, which is partly on private property and partly on
public property; and (3) apportion the receipts attributable to
the distributing system between private and public rights
of way."
(1) Gross receipts of the company from its telephone operations arise from two sources: its exchange service and its
intrastate 5 toll charges. We will first consider the problem
of determining the amount of gross receipts from exchange
service. The amount collected from the extended area during
the period in question was $27.724.579.76, and from the Del
Mar exchange $116.896.63. The amount collected from stations and equipment within the Old City from the two local
calling areas was $18.701.456. The trial court and the company agree that the total receipts from the exchange area
must be apportioned between the Old City and the remainder
of the local calling area; they differ . however. on the method
of allocation to be used. The trial court made its apportionment by using the ratio of the mileage of the distributing
system on public streets in the extended area to the mileage
on public property on the Old City part thereof. The company used the ratio of the amount invested in plant within
the two areas. The city, using the same method as did the
company during the term of the expired franehise. contends
that an apportionment of the entire receipts from the local
calling area is unnecessary, and that the amount of gross
receipts upon which to apply the Broughton Act is the amount
actually collected within the franchisE> area. the Old City.
'The data used in the following discussion are from the comp:m:v rerord!!,
kept pursuant to n uniform system of accounti~" pre~cribed by the
California Public Utilities Commission. the Fec1eril1 Commnnirntions Commission, and regulatory bodies of the severnl states.
·The Broughton Act does not flpply to interstnte business of the com·
pany. (Broughton Act, ~ 1; now Pub. "Gtil. Code, § 6001.)
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[7a] We have concluded that the city's contention cannot
be sustained. Receipts from exchange service represent a
charge to the subscriber for use of all the company's property within the local area, since for a flat monthly charge
he can call any subscriber therein. The amount collected
by the company from any particular subscriber is not attributable solely to that subscriber's telephone; it is attributable
.' to all of the equipment within the calling area. Receipts
collected within the Old City are partly earned by the company's facilities in the remainder of the calling area and
the converse is equally true.
It is therefore necessary to determine the Old City's share
of the total amounts received from exchange service. If conditions throughout the area were uniform, an apportionment
on the basis of mileage would be satisfactory. In the present
case, however, an apportionment based on relative investment
more appropriately measures the gross receipts attributable
to the various parts of the local calling area, for there is more
outside plant per mile 'of right of way in the heavily eongested
urban area comprising the Old City. It is reasonable to
assume that the franchise arecL contributes more to the production of revenue per mile of right-of-way than does the
more remote nonfranchise area.
[Sa] The next problem is to determine the amount of intrastate toll revenue attributable to the Old City. The trial court
did not take toll revenues into account. The company, however, uses the public streets of the Old City in earning its
revenue from toll calls and some of that revenue thus necessarily arises "from the use, op£:ration or possession" of the
franchise and comes within the Broughton Act. The city,
following the method used by the company during the expired franchise, computes the amount of toll revenue attributable to gross receipts by ascertaining the amount of toll
revenue originating within the Old City and allocating 20
per cent thereof to the Old City. No explanation is made
to justify the use of the figure of 20 per cent. The company;
on the other hand, begins its computation with its total toll
receipts in the state. It determines the Old City's share
thereof by using the ratio of the total investment of the company in toll plant within the state to its investment in toll
plant within the Old City.
Clearly, it would be impossible to compute with complete
accuracy the Old City's share of each of the thousands of toll
calls originating or terminating therein, for a separate calcu-
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lation would have to be made for each call. An approximation must be made and, in our opinion, the company's method
is practicable and allocates to the Old City its fair share of
toll receipts.
(2) The next step in determining the amount of gross receipts arising from the use of the franchise is to apportion
the gross receipts arising within the Old City between the
company's producing plant and its distributing system. The
city does not make this apportionment in its computation.
[9] As pointed out in the Tulare case, however, in applying
the Broughton Act it is necessary to determine "what proportion of the total annual gross receipts of the public utility
should be justly accredited to its distributing system over
various rights of way, as distinguished from its power plants
or other producing agencies." (County of Tulare v. City
0/ Dinuba, supra, 188 Cal. 664, 681.)
The city contends that the Tulare case is not applicable
here, on the ground that it involved an electric company that
manufactured its product in one locality and distributed it
in another, and that both factors contribute to the total gross
receipts, whereas the receipts of a telephone company arise
solely from its communication service and no revenues could
be obtained without use of the city streets. The proposed
distinction is untenable. A person buys electric service just
as he buys telephone service. In the one case electric power
supplies heat, light, and energy; in the other, spoken words
are converted into electric impulses and back again to spoken
words. The powerhouse of an electric company and the
central plant of a telephone company are essential to the
,operations of each; neither would have any gross receipts if
it had only its central plant and no other means of reaching
its customers than by use of the public streets.
.
It is therefore apparent that the apportionment· between
the distributing system and the remainder of the company's
plant must be made in the present case unless we overrule
the Tulare case and disapprove the Ocean Parle and Monrovia
cases. We have reexamined those cases and have concluded
that they were correctly decided.
[10] The payment required under the Broughton Aet is
based on the gross receipts of the utility "arising from its
use, operation or possession" of the franchise. It is a familiar
concept in public utility legislation and regulation that the
gross receipts of a utility arise from all of its operative property and not exclusively from anyone part thereof. (See
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Southern Cal. Tp-l. Co. v. Los A.ngclcs County, 212 Cal. 121,
129 [298 P. 9J ; Third <f~ B1'oadway Bldg. Co. v. Los Angeles
County, 220 Cal. 660, 663 [32 P.2d 377]; New Jersey Bell
Tel. Co. v. State Board of Taxes & Assessment, 280 U.S.
338, 348-349 [50 S.Ct. 111, 74 L.Ed. 463].) Thus, in the
present case the franchise, in common with all other operative
property of the company, contributes to its total gross receipts.
[11] The words of the Broughton Act, referring to receipts
arising from use of the franchise rather than to receipt&
arising from the use of all of the property, indicate that
an apportionment was to be made. The city would compute the amount due under the act as if it read, "tbe grantee
sball pay tbe proportion of two per cent of its entire gross
. 'receipts attributable to tbe franchise area whicb the number
of miles covered by the franchise granted bears to the total
number of miles in the franchise area." The act does not
admit of that construction.
[12a] It is necessary, therefore. to determine how to apportion gross receipts between the distributing system and tbe
otber operative property of the company. In our opinion,
a reasonable metbod is to allocate gross receipts by the ratio
tbat the company's investment in its distribntinf! s:vstem in
the area bears to its total investment in plant therein. Each
category of tbe company's property contributes to its total
gross receipts. As in rate making, it is reasonable to assume
that there is a relationship between the value of the property and the amount that it earns. Moreover, no other method
of apportionment is feasible, since invested value is the only
common factor between the distributing system and the other
operative property that fairly reflects the relative contribution of each category of property to the company's earnings.
Tbe city contends that an allocatioD could be made on a
linear basis but, obviously. that method is not feasible, for
powerhouses. office buildings. and the like cannot be measur~d
by the mile.
[13a] (3) Tbe final step in determining tbe amount of
gross receipts arising from the company's use of the public
streets witbin the Old City is to apportion the gross receipts
attributable to the distributing system between the parts
thereof on public and private rights of way.
In the Tulare case, the COl1rt stated that ordinarily the
apportionment should be made according to the ratio that
tIle mileage of tbe dh;tril;111i1''! ~~-"'1('m on TmbHc rights of
way bore to the entire mileage of the distributing system
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within the area. The court pointed out, however. that "There
may be instances where the extent or value of the distributing
system over a given right of way may indicate its earning
capacity.... In such cases these conditions should be taken
into account." (County of Tulare v. City of Dinuba, supra,
188 Cal. 664, 682.) An apportionment based on relative investment in the various parts of the distributing system was
upheld on a subsequent appeal in the Tulare litigation.
(County of Tulare v. City of Dinuba, 87 Cal.App. 744, 748
[263 P. 249J.)
As previously pointed out, in apportioning gross receipts
between the Old City and the remainder of the extended area
and the Del Mar exchange. a ratio based on relative investment should be used, so that the Old City will be allocated
its fair share of gross receipts. As between different parts
of the distributing system within the Old City, a ratio based
on relative investment would likewise fairly apportion receipts
between public and private rights of way.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, we consider the
interpretation of the 1946 judgment by the city, the trial court,
and the company.
[7b,8b] The city's method of computation: The city contends that if the amount due under the 1946 judgment is to be
governed by the ordinance, the company owes it $33,541.14.
The city arrives at that figure as follows: The total mileage
of the distributing system in the Old City is 562.44 miles,
of which 446.297 miles, or 79.35 per cent. is on public property. The gross receipts of the company collected from stations and equipment within the Old City are $21.017.085.16.
Those receipts are apportioned between public and private
parts of the distributing system by allocating to the former
79.35 per cent of the gross receipts, or $16,677,057.07. Two
per cent of that amount is $333.541.14.
The city arrives at $21.017.085.16 as the company's gross
receipts by taking the exchange service receipts actually collected by the company from stations and equipment within
the Old City and adding thereto 20 per cent of toll service
receipts from calls originating within the Old City. As previously pointed out, g-ross receipts cannot be computed in this
manner. [12b] The city's method is also erroneous in that
it attributes all of the receipts to the distributing system
and doC's not allocate any rp('C'ipts to the use of the company)s
other property. Fillally, the city has erred in apportioning
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receipts between the public and private parts of the company's distributing system by use of a mileage ratio instead
of a relative investment ratio.
[Sc, 12c] The trial court's method of computation: The trial
court concluded that the amount due under the 1946 judgment was $239,337.23. It arrived at that figure as follows:
The mileage of the distributing system on public streets in
the San Diego extended area is 1,026.2146 miles, of which
442.8827 miles, or 43.15 per cent, is on public property in
the Old City. The gross receipts of the company in the
extended area during the period in question were $27,724,579.76. Of that amount 43.15 pcr cent, or $11,963,156.17,
'is apportioned to use of the public streets in the franchise
area. Two per cent of that amount is $239,263.12. The same
formula applied to that part of the Old City within the Del
Mar exchange gives $74.11, which added to the preceding
. figure makes a total of $239,337.23. The trial court did not
take toll receipts into account.
The trial court thus made the same error as did the city
in failing to allocate any of the company's receipts to its
powerhouses, office buildings, and other property not subject
to any franchise charge. The trial court disregarded toll
calls, although the company used the public streets in obtaining toll revenue. [7c] The trial court used a mileage ratio in
making its apportionment between total receipts in the extended area and the receipts attributable to the Old City,
although, as we have seen, a ratio based on relative investment is appropriate to the present case. [13b] Finally, the
trial court did not take into account the fact that part of the
company's distribution system is on private rights of way.
Had it done so, its ratio would have been the ratio of outside
plant on public streets in the Old City, 442.882 miles, to outside plant on public and private rights of way in the extended
area, 1,409.573 miles, or 31.42 per cent.
[7d, Sd, 12d] The company's method of cmnputation: The
company contends that the amount due under the 1946 judgment is $158,670.03. It arrives at that figure as follows: The
total investment in plant in the San Diego extended area
• According to the company, the correct figure is 1,029.314 miles.

If

tlwt mileage were used, the amount due under the trial court's method

would be $238,672.08.
'The city's ngure of 446.297 miles in the Old City is the total of
442.882 mDes in the extended aren, 0.795 miles in the Del Nar exchange,
anu 2.G2 miles attributed to toll plant.
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(e:tc1uding the part allocated to toll use) is $26,916,709, of
which $5,238,777, or 19.46 per cent, is invested in outside
plant on public streets in the Old City. For a sample period,
January 1 to August 31, 1949, the gross receipts from the
extended area were $5,076,394.89. Of that amount, 19.46
per cent is $987,866.45, the amount of gross receipts attrib~
utable to the use of the streets in the Old City. The same
formula applied to the Del Mar exchange gives $57.78. The
company applies the same method to toll receipts from the
entire state, which results in $177,973.65 attributable to the
Old City. The total gross receipts from the three sources
of gross receipts attributable to the use of streets in the
Old City is $1,165,897.88. Two per cent of that amount
is $23,317.96, the amount due for 1949. Applying the same
method to the other years results in the company's total of
$158,670.03.
Under the views expressed in this opinion, the company
applied correct legal principles in its computation. It used
8 ratio based on relative investment in each of the three steps
necessary to determine the amount of gross receipts arising
from use of the public streets within the Old City: (1) ascer~
taining the Old City's share of receipts for local service within
the extended area and the Del Mar exchange', and of intrastate
toll charges; (2) ascertaining the distributing system's share
of the amount attributable to the Old City; and (3) ascertaining the franchise's share of the amount attributable to the
distributing system.
The company has requested that this court direct the trial
court to enter judgment in its favor. Some of the data used
by the company in arriving at its computation, however, have
not been found to be true by the trial court. We have used
these data in this opinion to illustrate application of the
legal principles herein discussed but, of course, we cannot
deny the city an opportunity to challenge the accuracy and
completeness of the company's figures in the trial court.
The judgment is reversed for further proceedings in conformity with the views expressed in this opinion. The city
shall bear the costs of this appeal
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J'J Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the
juugment of reversal, but do not agree with the reasonin"
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advanced by the majority, nor do I feel that a judgment
should be rendered in conformity with such views.
It is my considered opinion that the majority view ~ a
departure from the rule established in the Dinuba case
(Cou.nty of Tulare v. City of Dinuba, 188 Cal. 664 [206 P •
. 983]), in that it seeks to employ the capital investment
method of apportionment beyond its limitations.
The same general principles which I enunciated in my
dissent in the Southern Counties Gas case (County of Los
Angeles v. Southern Counties Gas Co., post, p. 129 [266
P.2d 27]) should be applicable to the instant case, since
in both cases the mnnicipality granting the franchise is
. entitled to 2 per cent of the gross annual receipts arising
from the "use, operation, or possession" of the franchise.
There are, however, a few problems in regard to telephone
revenues which are not present in cases involving gas and
electric companies. One such problem has to do with the
apportionment of toll receipts. It is true that part of the
tolls collected in an area are for communication services rendered in other areas, where the message is transmitted and
received; however, inasmuch as messages are also sent into
and received in the local area without any revenues being
collected there it would seem that the factors would balance
each other out. Thus, by attributing all local tolls collected
in an area to the gross receipts of that area, Wf' are giving
credit for some services rendered elsewhere ~ but this is counterbalanced by the faet that an equal proportion of toll calls
are probably transmitted or received by the local area without
any increase to its gross receipts.
In the case at bar the gross receipts (including toll receipts)
eollected by the telephone company within the extended area
should be used as the starting point in our formula. These·
gross receipts should be apportioned between the distribution
system and other systems (such as production facilities) so
as to ascertain the proportion of gross receipts attributable
to the entire distribution system. These gross receipts of
the entire distribution system should then be apportioned
between the public and private franchises on a mileage basis.
Since 43.15 per cent of the mileage in the extended area is
on public property within the Old City, 43.15 per cent of
the entire distribution receipts should be allocated to the
fund from which the 2 per cent is to be taken.
For these reasons. and those giYen in my dissent in the
Southau Counties Gas case, post, p. 129 [266 P.2d 271.
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[ feel it would be a grave error to follow the formula established by the majority. Such a formula is not consistent
with the Dinuba case nor with the best interests of the genp.ral
publie.
Plaintiff and appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied
February 17, 1954. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the
petition should be granted.
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COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN
COUNTIES GAS COMP ANY OF CALIFORNIA (a
Corporation), Respondent.
[1] Franchises-Charges and Percentages-Gross Receipts.-Gross
receipts of gas company which was granted franchise by county
to lay its pipes in public roads and highways arise from all
of its operative property, whether or not such property is
located on rights of way, public or private, or on land owned
or leased by it or on land owned by others.
[2] ld.-Charges and Percentages - Operative Property.-Operative property of gas company which was granted franchise
by county to lay its pipes in public roads and highways consists of various kinds of real and personal property, including
land leased or owned, compressor stations and equipment,
meter stations and equipment, gas production equipment, pipe
lines, valves, general office buildings, warehouses, transportation equipment, laboratory eqllipment, etc.
[3] ld.-Charges and Percentages-Effect of Broughton Act.Since the 2 per cent charge due county for franchise granted
gas company by county ordinance pursuant to the Broughton
Act (Stats. 1905, p. 777; now Pub. Uti!. Code, §§ 6001-6071)
applies only to gross receipts arising from use of franchise,
gross receipts arising from operative property other than franchise must be excluded from base to which the 2 per cent
charge applies.
[4] ld.-Charges and Percentages-Gross Receipts.-Since every
dollar invested in operative property of franchise bolder earns
an equal part of gross receipts, such receipts are attributable
to a particular item or class of operative property according to
[1] See Cal.Jur. lO-Yr.Supp. (1950 Rev.), Franchises, § 14a.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-12] Franchises, § 21.
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